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1349 
Daniel Kahneman’s Influence on Legal Theory 
Russell Korobkin* 
The story of Daniel Kahneman’s extraordinary influence on the legal 
academy begins in the 1960s and early 1970s, when the field of law and 
economics revolutionized legal theory.  The field, as such, was launched 
by Ronald Coase’s The Problem of Social Cost1 and Guido Calabresi’s 
The Cost of Accidents,2 and it became a substantial force in the academy 
with the publication of the first edition of Richard Posner’s famous 
treatise, Economic Analysis of Law.3  The seminal insight of law and 
economics was very simple and straightforward, but at the same time 
quite powerful: like prices, laws and regulations act as incentives for 
behavior, and people who are subject to the law can be expected to 
respond to these incentives.  There are a couple of important corollaries 
to this basic insight.  One is that the law can be used to encourage 
socially desirable conduct and discourage socially undesirable 
misconduct.4 Another is that the law has important efficiency 
implications; that is, law creates costs as well as benefits, and it is 
important to consider both effects when evaluating its efficacy.5 
In order to operationalize these powerful concepts, a theory 
concerning how exactly law will shape the behavior of the governed is 
necessary.  For its behavioral assumptions, law and economics imported 
 
*  Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. 
1. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
2. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
(1970).   
3. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1st ed. 1972).  The treatise is 
currently in its eighth edition.  Coase reminds us that Posner’s wealth maximization theory has 
“clearly played the major role” in the growth of law and economics in the legal academy.  R.H. 
Coase, Law and Economics at Chicago, 36 J.L. & ECON. 239, 251 (1993).  For an extensive 
summary (and critique) of Posner’s law and economics’ theories, see David Campbell, Welfare 
Economics for Capitalists: The Economic Consequences of Judge Posner, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2233 (2012).  
4. See generally Steven Shavell, Law versus Morality as Regulators of Conduct, 4 AM. L. & 
ECON. REV. 227 (2002) (discussing the incentives created by law and the desirability and pitfalls 
of relying on legal incentives to regulate societally acceptable behaviors). 
5. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the 
Rational Choice Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1053–54 (2000). 
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from microeconomics the assumptions of “rational choice theory.”6  
The thin version of rational choice theory assumes that people have 
fixed preferences, or ends, and that they employ optimal means to 
achieve their ends subject to existing constraints.7  This version of the 
theory is agnostic, however, about the content of preferences.  The thick 
version assumes not only that people optimize, but that they possess a 
preference function that is entirely self-interested and, at least in market 
settings, revolves around maximizing financial well-being.8 
As successful as law and economics was in shaping thought in the 
legal academy, its rational choice theory foundation proved 
problematic.  That is, much of the legal academy found rational choice 
theory to be unpersuasive as a description of how human beings actually 
act.9  To most of us—and even to many economists—it was obvious 
that people often do not appear to optimize the satisfaction of their 
preferences, and doubly obvious that many do not zealously pursue only 
their self-interest, at least in many circumstances.10  Any theory that 
seemed to rest on such claims could not help but seem dubious. 
The law and economics movement tried to finesse this problem with 
what I call the “Milton Friedman slight-of-hand.”  Referencing 
Friedman’s famous statement that assumptions of economic models 
need not be descriptively realistic if they yield accurate predictions,11 
legal economists would respond to the obvious criticism that rational 
choice theory is implausible as a description of behavior by saying, 
“Yes, of course, we know that people do not actually optimize, but they 
 
6. See generally Thomas S. Ulen, Rational Choice Theory in Law and Economics, in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 790 (1999) (explaining rational choice theory and 
summarizing literature from psychology, economics, and other disciplines that criticized rational 
choice theory). 
7. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 5, at 1067–68 (describing and arguing the inadequacy of 
the thin version of rational choice theory). 
8. Id. at 1060–67. 
9. See, e.g., id. at 1060–75; W. Bradley Wendel, Mixed Signals: Rational-Choice Theories of 
Social Norms and the Pragmatics of Explanation, 77 IND. L.J. 1, 26–56 (2002). 
10. See generally Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions: The Limits of 
Law and Economics, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1309 (1986) (arguing that law and economics, “in the 
form of cost-benefit or other efficiency based-analysis,” can lead to inaccurate conclusions); 
Allen Leff, The Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism about Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 
451, 474–77 (1974) (casting doubt on the notion that individuals maximize utility and vigorously 
act out of self-interest); Frank I. Michelman, Reflections on Professional Education, Legal 
Scholarship, and the Law-and-Economics Movement, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 197 (1983) (arguing 
that “the form of consciousness and behavior posited by law and economics is only one side of 
the story of what people . . . are and can be like”).  
11. Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE 
ECONOMICS 3, 15 (1953).   
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behave as if they were optimizing.”12  I always found this claim to be 
extremely unpersuasive.  If people don’t actually optimize, then why 
would their behavior be consistent with optimization?  Many other 
scholars who were otherwise interested in and persuaded by the 
methodology of law and economics struggled with this question as 
well.13  The conclusion is often asserted by legal economists, but never 
explained as a matter of deductive logic or justified with empirical data 
beyond pointing out the success of some very general, directional 
predictions, such as that demand will decline as prices increase.14 
This is where the work of Daniel Kahneman, his long-time colleague 
Amos Tversky, and their followers become an important part of the 
story of law and economics.  Kahneman and his colleagues taught us 
two important general points about decision making and human 
behavior that allowed the field of law and economics to begin to 
construct more realistic behavioral underpinnings. 
First, people usually use heuristics to evaluate the world around them. 
Kahneman calls this “System 1” (“fast”) thinking.15  People use System 
1 quite often, both when trying to understand what is happening in the 
world around them and when trying to determine what actions to take to 
achieve their goals.  When faced with difficult questions about the 
nature of the world, people have a tendency to substitute questions that 
lead more easily to intuitive answers, and then to answer those easier 
questions.  For example, rather than tackle the difficult problem of 
whether Ford stock is likely to be a better investment than available 
 
12. See Amir N. Licht, Expanded Rationality: From the Preferred to the Desirable, with Some 
Implications for Law, 35 QUEEN’S L.J. 245, 246 (2009) (noting this standard response of 
economists to the assertion that their behavioral model is “patently unrealistic”).    
13. Licht put it like this: 
Milton Friedman famously argued that although the assumptions underlying 
economic theory should be appropriate to the particular problem being addressed, they 
need not capture exactly how economic actors really behave; it is sufficient that these 
actors behave as if they follow these assumptions . . . . 
That age of innocence is gone. . . .  [I]t would be fair to say that mainstream 
economics has now recognized the need to assume how people really behave. 
Id. at 247. 
14. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to 
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1485–87 (1998) (analyzing the claim that rational 
choice theory provides correct behavioral predictions).  
15. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 20–21 (2011).  Professor Kahneman 
defines System 2 as “the conscious, reasoning self that has beliefs, makes choices, and decides 
what to think about what to do.”  Id. at 21.  As for the relationship between the two systems, 
Professor Kahneman describes System 1 “as effortlessly originating impressions and feelings that 
are the main source of the explicit beliefs and deliberate choices of System 2.”  Id.  The System 
1/System 2 terminology was actually introduced in Keith E. Stanowich & Richard F. West, 
Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the Rationality Debate?, 23 BEHAV. & 
BRAIN SCI. 645 (2000). 
4_KOROBKIN.DOCX 5/8/2013  12:19 PM 
1352 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  44 
alternatives, an investor might answer the easier question of whether he 
thinks Ford makes good cars.16  The consequence of this is that our 
behaviors will not always represent the optimal means of achieving our 
desired ends. 
This does not mean—as Professor Kahneman has quite clearly stated 
—that human beings are “irrational.”17  Globally, the use of System 1 
reasoning is a highly rational method of coping with the huge amount of 
information we must confront daily.  If we tried to use our logically 
superior but relatively ponderous “System 2” (“slow”) formal reasoning 
capabilities to analyze every piece of information that we come into 
contact with, we simply would not be able to make it through the day.18  
But even though our heavy reliance on System 1 is reasonable, it has the 
side effect of causing us to make mistakes in judgment and behavior, in 
the sense that we often act in ways that are non-optimal.19 
Second, our preferences are constructed based, at least in large part, 
on the contextual features that exists when we are called upon to 
determine our preferences.20  This means that not only are our ends not 
necessarily 100 percent self-interested, but that they are not even 100 
percent fixed.  Preferences are not random, but they do fluctuate and 
vary in their intensity with changes in context.21 
Beyond these general, fundamental insights, Kahneman and Tversky, 
 
16. KAHNEMAN, supra note 15, at 12 (recalling a conversation with an investment 
professional). 
17. See id. at 411 (“The definition of rationality as coherence is impossibly restrictive; it 
demands adherence to rules of logic that a finite mind is not able to implement.  Reasonable 
people cannot be rational by that definition, but they should not be branded as irrational for that 
reason.  Irrational is a strong word, which connotes impulsivity, emotionality, and a stubborn 
resistance to reasonable argument.  I often cringe when my work with Amos [Tversky] is credited 
with demonstrating that human choices are irrational, when in fact our research only showed that 
Humans are not well described by the rational-agent model.”).   
18. See id. at 21–22.   
19. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 35–36 (2007).   
20. See generally Sarah Lichtenstein & Paul Slovic, The Construction of Preference: An 
Overview, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF PREFERENCE 1 (Lichtenstein & Slovic eds., 2006) 
(introducing the concept that “in many situations, we do not really know what we prefer; we must 
construct our preferences as the situation arises”). 
21. Indeed, “we spend our lives . . . building preferences,” and “[t]hese preferences are readily 
available for use.”  Id. at 1.  Difficult situations arise, however, when certain decision elements 
are unfamiliar or when the choices available “present a conflict among our known preferences,” 
and even when our preferences are clear, it is difficult to “translate our positive and negative 
feelings into a numerical response.”  Id.  Dr. Lichtenstein and Dr. Slovic give the example of 
choosing between two apartments to rent; one with large windows and a view but a small kitchen, 
and the other with no view but a big kitchen.  Id.  In such a case, preferences for large kitchens 
and attractive views are not particularly helpful.  While individuals may understand their 
preferences for individual aspects, choosing between them is problematic, and making a decision 
requires a “tradeoff between one aspect (view) and the other (kitchens).”  Id.      
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along with many of their students and colleagues who have followed in 
their footsteps, taught us, and continue to teach us, about the variety of 
heuristics we use, when we use them, and how we use them.  This body 
of work allows us to think more accurately and precisely about how law 
can be used to (1) promote the efficient allocation of resources (if that is 
our goal), (2) encourage certain socially desirable conduct (when that is 
our goal), and (3) help individuals fulfill their potential (when that is our 
goal).  The combination of the methodology of law and economics and 
the behavioral insights of Kahneman and Tversky’s research has 
produced an approach to legal theory that has come to be known as 
“behavioral law and economics.”22  This way of thinking has won a 
substantial following in the legal academy, including most of the 
adherents of “traditional” law and economics and its rational-choice 
roots and many who were formerly sympathetic to the law and 
economics project but skeptical of its flawed behavioral assumptions. 
In the early 1990s, when I began to attempt to apply some of the 
insights of Professor Kahneman to the analysis of legal rules within the 
law and economics framework, one well-known luminary in the field of 
law and economics (whose name I will not mention) told me that my 
work was interesting, but that it was not law and economics.  Another 
luminary, as highly-regarded as the first but a bit more blunt, asked me 
why I was wasting my time with the “psychology stuff.”  Well, times 
have changed significantly in the last two decades.  As an economist 
might say, the market has spoken, and the market seems to prefer the 
new behavioral law and economics to the traditional, rational-choice-
theory law and economics.  More importantly, the Kahneman-Tversky 
influence has helped the field of law and economics to win a larger 
following in the legal academy than the field traditionally enjoyed. 
Here is some evidence, admittedly impressionistic.  In 1998, 
Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, and Richard Thaler published A 
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics.23  This is the most cited 
law review article within the last 20 years—in any field, not just within 
the parameters of law and economics—and the competition is not close.  
No other article comes within 100 citations of that one.24  Two years 
 
22. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) (providing readers with what is widely 
considered a de facto layperson’s treatise on the behavioral approach to law).  For a concise and 
empirical recounting of the precipitous rise of the “behavioral law and economics” school of 
thought within legal academia, see Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law 
and Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1033, 
1053–55 (2012).        
23. See supra note 14.  
24. See Russell Korobkin, What Comes After Victory for Behavioral Law and Economics, 
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later, my colleague Tom Ulen and I published Law and Behavioral 
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and 
Economics.25  This article is the most cited law review article in any 
field published since the year 2000.26  Of the ten most cited law review 
articles published since 1995, fully half of them are appropriately 
categorized as falling within the field of behavioral law and 
economics.27 
Professor Kahneman is not a law professor, yet his work has been 
cited in 2810 law journal articles.28  Even more impressive, the number 
of citations to his work in law journals has continued on a steady 
upward trajectory for the last three decades,29 even though his most 
influential articles were published in the 1970s.30  Normally citations 
over time, even to influential articles, increase for a few years as 
scholars become familiar with the material and then quickly tail off.31  
But Professor Kahneman’s influence continues to grow. 
To be sure, there are valid criticisms of the behavioral turn in law and 
economics.  The first is that, because context is so important in how the 
mind works, behavioral law and economics analysis requires a very 
context-specific policy analysis.32  The optimal legal rule for protecting 
investors, for example, might be different than the optimal rule for 
 
2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1653, 1653–54 & n.6.   
25. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 5.   
26. See Korobkin, What Comes After Victory, supra note 24, at 1654 & n.8.  See also Fred R. 
Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 
1483, 1489 (2012).  
27. Korobkin, What Comes After Victory, supra note 24, at 1655 & n.9. 
28. Result of search in the Westlaw “JLR” database for Daniel /2 Kahneman as of March 1, 
2013.  The same result showed thirty-three cases that cited to Kahneman’s work.   
29. According to the same search of the Westlaw JLR database, Kahneman’s work was cited 0 
times in 1982, 49 times in 1992, 100 times in 2002, and 210 times in 2012.   
30. According to the Social Science Citation Index, Kahneman’s two most cited articles are 
Prospect Theory: Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979) (cited 8353 
times) and Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974) (cited 
6594 times), both co-authored with Amos Tversky. 
31. See Ian Ayres & Fredrick E. Vars, Determinants of Citations to Articles in Elite Law 
Reviews, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 427, 436 (2000) (finding that citations per year peak at 4 years after 
publication, and an article receives half of its expected total lifetime citations 4.6 years after 
publication). 
32. See, e.g., Gregory Mitchell, Tendencies versus Boundaries: Levels of Generality in 
Behavioral Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1781, 1799 (2003) (“[T]here are few 
indisputable and broad tendencies when it comes to irrational behavior.  As a result, it makes little 
sense, and can be misleading, to speak of depersonalized, decontexualized irrational tendencies.); 
Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1551, 1559 (1998) (“It is profoundly unclear what ‘behavioral man’ would do in any given 
situation”); Jennifer H. Arlen, The Future of Behavioral Economics and the Law, 51 VAND. L. 
REV. 1765, 1768 (1998) (arguing that behavioral economic analysis lacks a “coherent, robust, 
tractable model of human behavior that can serve as a basis for [policy] recommendations”).  
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protecting the purchasers of consumer products.33  Different contexts 
might cause people to use different heuristics when generating System 1 
intuitions.  Lawmakers cannot assume that a general policy of 
disclosing all information, and then letting the market work to allow 
people to optimize their own individual utility functions, will work in 
the way that traditional law and economics often assumed.  You have to 
get down into the detail of the context if you have any hope of offering 
the best possible legal analysis in light of behavior. 
A second problem is that System 2 reasoning is not employed to the 
same degree or in the same situations by all individuals or categories of 
individuals who are subject to the law.34  So we may need different 
rules for some types of investors who are more capable or better trained 
to use System 2 analysis, than would be appropriate for investors who 
rely on System 1 heuristics.  (But we may not—resolving such 
questions requires empirical research and careful thinking.) 
A third problem is that, because law makers employ heuristic-based 
System 1 reasoning just like everybody else, the issue of comparative 
institutional competence will always be lurking.35  In any particular 
context, are the mistakes in judgment that individuals subject to the law 
might make, causing them not to maximize their subjective expected 
utility, going to be worse than those that law makers might make when 
they are trying to design the optimal rules to help protect the people 
who use System 1 reasoning? 
A fourth challenge, and perhaps the most daunting, is that if 
preferences are not fixed, but instead depend on context, how do we 
even determine which preference function the law should try to 
maximize, either for individual actors or as a matter of social welfare?  
To use one oft-used example, Kahneman and Tversky’s “prospect 
theory” predicts that people will often place a higher value on things 
that they own than on things that they do not own because “losses loom 
larger than gains.”36  Giving up an entitlement is perceived as a cost that 
outweighs the benefits of obtaining the same entitlement, all other 
 
33. In addition, some scholars have argued that regulatory protections appropriate for 
consumer contracts may not be appropriate in sophisticated business transactions where the 
parties are presumably more cognitively skilled and experienced.  Korobkin, What Comes After 
Victory, supra note 24, at 1671 (citing Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the 
Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 544 (2003)).      
34. See id. at 1668–71 (acknowledging that the underlying experimental work “nearly always 
suggests” that individuals do not “use the same heuristics or fall prey to the same decision-
making biases”). 
35. See id. at 1658–59.   
36. Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 30, at 279.   
4_KOROBKIN.DOCX 5/8/2013  12:19 PM 
1356 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  44 
things being equal.37  If the goal is to facilitate the efficient allocation of 
certain legal entitlements, it is not obvious what the appropriate baseline 
should be.  Do we take into account the gain perspective or the loss 
perspective?  Or do we try to take into account different perspectives 
depending on the positions of the individuals involved in our analysis?  
This issue is one I have been struggling with in my work for some years 
now.38 
Despite the difficult challenges raised and problems to be solved, I 
believe that behavioral law and economics is the future of law and 
economics, and the future of legal policy analysis more generally.  If 
you have lost your keys in the bushes, there is simply no use searching 
on the sidewalk under the street lamp of rational choice theory simply 
because that’s where the light is.  You have to look in the bushes even if 
it is dark and the footing is treacherous.  As those of us in the legal 
academy wade into those dark and treacherous bushes, we can and 
should continue to thank Professor Kahneman for giving us, at least, a 
powerful flashlight to help us find our way. 
 
 
37. See Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227 
(2003).  
38. See, e.g., id.; Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The 
Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583 (1998); Russell 
Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998); 
Russell Korobkin, Note, Policymaking and the Offer/Asking Price Gap: Toward a Theory of 
Efficient Entitlement Allocation, 46 STAN. L. REV. 663 (1994).  
